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This paper analyses how the 2008-11 financial crisis relates to work-related common mental distress 13 
of those with continuous employment during the crisis. The literature connecting the 2008-11 financial 14 
crisis to common mental distress (anti-depressant drug use, suicide, etc.) generally estimates a 15 
negative effect. We used a sample of 393 workplaces from the 2011 Work and Employment Relations 16 
Study (WERS) for which employers and worker representatives agreed on that the crisis affected the 17 
workplace. WERS then provides detailed questions about how the financial crisis affected the 18 
workplace. We use these questions to show which crisis-induced work-changes are important for 19 
work-related common mental distress. In the British-context, increased workload and changes in non-20 
financial benefits of work are most relevant worsening work-related common mental distress by 1.8 21 
and 0.9 on a scale from 0-30 respectively. 22 
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2 
1. INTRODUCTION 42 
There is a recent and growing health economics literature that analyses how macro-level economic 43 
development affects individual health (Cawley et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2009; Ruhm, 2015, 2016; 44 
Wang et al., 2018). Bradford and Lastrapes (2014) show that a one percent decline in employment is 45 
associated with a ten percent increase in the prescription of anti-depressants in the US. The systematic 46 
review by Parmar et al. (2016) confirm these findings for Europe, concluding that suicides increased 47 
and common mental distress generally worsened due to the 2008-11 financial crisis. 48 
The World Bank estimates that the UK GDP in 2007 was $3.074 trillion dropping to $2.383 trillion in 49 
2009 and only recovering to roughly the pre-crisis level by 2014 ($ 3.023 trillion)
1
. During the 50 
financial year 2008/09, 11.42 million working days were lost due to stress, depression and anxiety 51 
(UK Health and Safety Executive)
2
. So it is understandable that there is a large literature studying the 52 
(mental) health effects of the 2008-11 financial crisis (for brevity hereafter just referred to as crisis).  53 
The focus of most of the present research addresses that the crisis affected common mental distress 54 
(Askitas and Zimmermann, 2015; Ayers et al., 2012; Deaton, 2012). A smaller but growing part of the 55 
literature tries to unpick the underlying mechanisms. The first part of this subset is focused on 56 
identifying how business cycles movements affect individual level wealth and income and how those 57 
changes translates into mental health changes. McInerney et al. (2013) show for example that the crisis 58 
lead to worse common mental distress and increase antidepressant use of those aged over 50. They 59 
identify lost wealth (retirement savings) as the driving factor. Currie and Tekin (2015) provide 60 
evidence that spikes in foreclosures due the crisis lead to unscheduled hospitalizations including for 61 
common mental distress problems. This literature also links these changes in individual level income 62 
and wealth to health behaviours that can affect mental health. Examples are the works by Dávalos et 63 
al. (2012) and Ásgeirsdóttir et al. (2016) who link the 2008-11 financial crisis to excessive alcohol 64 
consumption and report that alcohol consumption (in contrast to other health behaviours) did not 65 
return its pre-crisis level, respectively. 66 
                                                     
 
1 The unit is 2016 dollars and conversion from Great British Pound to US dollar is done with yearly official exchange rates. The data and 
more information on the underlying calculations can be accessed here: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?cid=GPD_29&end=2016&locations=GB&start=2002 (last accessed 20th of June 
2018).  
2 The 2008/09 financial year had 255 working days, so the equivalent of 44,784 full-time jobs were lost to society due to common mental 
health problems .The UK Health and Safety Executive provides working days lost in full-day equivalents already accounting for variation in 
working hours. 
3 
The second part of this literature links business cycle movements to changes in individual employment 67 
and seeks to understand how this affects mental health. The most influential study in this area is Ruhm 68 
(2000) who estimates the effect of economic conditions on suicide (and other health outcomes) using 69 
US data from 1972-1991 and state level unemployment. He finds a counter-cyclically relationship 70 
between unemployment and suicide (Ruhm, 2000). Ruhm and others then reanalyze this finding with 71 
mostly consistent results for suicides (Charles and DeCicca, 2008; Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006; Ruhm, 72 
2015, 2016). One of the exceptions is Haaland and Telle (2015) who find a pro-cyclical relationship in 73 
Norway. This leads to the third-strain of literature where this work fits best.  74 
This part of the literature tries to build on the first two, and asks what it is about work that affects 75 
mental health. Fishback et al. (2007) and Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006) report findings indicating that 76 
social security systems buffer the health-effects of recessions. Ólafsdóttir et al. (2015) and Xu (2013) 77 
look at working hours as a mechanism between the financial crisis and health. Ólafsdóttir et al. (2015) 78 
analyse the effect of the crisis on smoking (not mental health) in Iceland. They consider the labour 79 
market mechanism through which the crisis could affect smoking, but their data is limited to real 80 
income and working hours as potential mechanisms. They find no evidence that links working hours 81 
or real income to the observed reduction in smoking, rather the reduction is driven by an increase in 82 
prices due to the devaluation of Icelandic currency during the crisis, as tobacco is an import product. 83 
Xu (2013) using US data finds that increases in the number of hours worked are linked with higher 84 
cigarette use, less exercise and a lower number of physician visits. 85 
To our knowledge no study has looked at a larger number of changes within the workplace and their 86 
effects on common mental distress. This paper aims to fill this gap by using detailed questions on how 87 
the crisis affected the workplace and how employees' work-related common mental distress was 88 
affected by this. Further, while most previous work relied on surveyed individuals reporting whether 89 
or not they were affected by the crisis (Deaton, 2012; Jones et al., 2016; McInerney et al., 2013; 90 
Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015), we leverage data from three perspectives on the impact of the 2008-11 91 
financial crisis (employees, worker representatives, managers) to reduce the potential impact of 92 
justification bias. Finally, in the absence of causal estimates in the literature and the absence of cohort 93 
and longitudinal data, our fixed effects approach offers insights into the range of relationships between 94 
specific crisis-induced changes in the workplace and common mental distress in the workplace 95 
currently not available in the literature. 96 
  97 
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2. DATA 98 
The analysis is conducted on the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study (2011 WERS) which 99 
was conducted between spring 2011 and summer 2012 (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). The 2011 WERS 100 
covered 2,680 workplaces in Britain employing 21,981 employees. Interviews were conducted with 101 
senior human resource managers and worker representatives as well as sample of up to 25 employees 102 
per workplace. The WERS 2011 asked human resource managers (for brevity referred to as managers 103 
hereafter), worker representatives and employees if and how they thought the workplace was affected 104 
by the crisis. Each of these groups was provided with a number of possible effects the crisis had on 105 
their workplace. We use the perspectives of managers and worker representatives to establish whether 106 
workplaces were affected by the 2008-11 financial crisis: if for a given workplace both managers and 107 
workplace representatives indicate that at least one change happened due to the crisis (and they did not 108 
tick the option that no changes happened), then we classified a given workplace as affected by the 109 
crisis. The motivation behind this approach is the concern that workers might try to justify their worse 110 
common mental distress with the financial crisis, even if the financial crisis was not felt at their 111 
workplace. This process is known as justification bias and has been a concern in research estimating 112 
the association of changes in the labour market on health for decades (Butler et al., 1987; Currie and 113 
Madrian, 1999; Martin, 2009; McGarry, 2004). Our approach is likely to reduce the problem of 114 
justification bias but does not necessarily solve it as employees within affected workplaces might still 115 
over-report the financial crisis to justify their state of common mental distress. Worker representatives 116 
and managers have opposing incentives to misreport whether the financial crisis affected their 117 
workplace. Therefore we assume that agreement between the two implies with more certainty that the 118 
workplace was indeed affected. 119 
Selecting only workplaces for which worker representatives and manager report a crisis effect reduces 120 
the sample to 4,802 employees in 393 workplaces. The two main reasons for this reduction is that for 121 
13,728 employees from 1,240 workplaces the crises was not felt, this includes employees who did not 122 
work at the surveyed workplace during the crisis. While for another 10,849 employees from 1,124 123 
workplaces, no data for worker representatives was available. Of course, these criteria are not mutually 124 
exclusive and therefore the sample is reduced by less than the sum of the two cleaning rules. 125 
Furthermore, for 231 employees some information on key variables (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) is 126 
missing. This leaves us with a sample of 4,802 employees and 393 workplaces that report to have been 127 
affected by the crisis giving us a sample of crisis-survivors. 128 
Work-related common mental distress is measured at employee level with the question “Thinking of 129 
the past few weeks, how much of the time has your job made you feel each of the following?” with the 130 
possible options of tense, depressed, worried, gloomy, uneasy and miserable (Jones et al., 2016; Warr, 131 
1990). The possible answers are then rated with the following response options and the respective 132 
value given in square brackets: “All of the time” [1], “Most of the time” [2], “Some of the Time” [3], 133 
5 
“Occasionally” [4] and “Never” [5]. Based on these questions a measure of work-related common 134 




Table I presents how employees, managers and worker representatives reported how the crisis affected 137 
their workplace. The most common reaction to the crisis from an employee perspective were frozen or 138 
cut wages with a share of nearly 47% of employees reporting it. Other common reactions were 139 
increased workload with 38% or reorganized work with about a quarter of employees reporting this. 140 
The replies by managers and worker representatives are hard to compare, but the one identical 141 
category “Wages frozen or cut” is at the top of all three lists. 142 
Further variables considered in the analysis are region (8 regions covering England, Scotland and 143 
Wales), age from 16 onwards grouped in 9 categories, whether the person is white or non-white, male 144 
or female, works in the private or public sector
4
, and whether the employee submitted the survey 145 
online or via paper. 146 
Table II offers descriptive statistics for the sample. The majority of the sample is white (93%), less 147 
than half of the sample is male and only 14% of the employees submitted the survey online. 148 
To explore whether employees can influence how their workplace reacted to the crisis we also employ 149 
a question asked to the worker representative about their involvement in changes: “At this workplace 150 
[union / employee] representatives work closely with management when changes are being 151 
introduced.” We code “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” as high-involvement workplaces and “Neither 152 
agree nor disagree”, “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree” as low-involvement workplaces.  153 
                                                     
 
3 We used several approaches to evaluate the suitability of the score for further analysis. We determined the intraclass correlations (ICCs) for 
the individual questions to gauge the size of the effect workplaces had on employees' responses. The ICCs ranged from ICC = .033 
(depressed) to .053 (misery), indicating small cluster effects. We then used a principal component analysis to evaluate how much variance in 
the responses to the six questions would maximally be attributable to a single component, both for the original variables as well as for the 
responses centred around the worplace average (analogue to our fixed effects analysis). The amount of explained variance was ρ=.69 (ρ =.68 
for workplace-centred variables, respectively). The results indicate that a score captures substantial parts of the inter-individual variance 
across the six variables and is hardly influenced by the clustered nature of the data. 
4 Private sector is defined as the workplace being part of company that has one of the following statuses: Public Limited Company, Private 
Limited Company, Company limited by guarantee, Partnership/ Self-proprietorship, Trust/Charity, Body established by Royal Charter or Co-
operative/Mutual/Friendly society. Public sector is defined as the workplace being part of company that has one of the following statuses: 
Government-owned limited company/Nationalised industry/Trading Public Corporation, Public service agency, Other non-trading public 
corporation, Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisation as well as Local/Central Government (inc. NHS and Local Education 
Authorities). The status is reported by the manager and the assignment into private and public sector is adopted from the codebook for the 
Management Questionnaire of WERS 2011. 
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Table I – Workplace Changes Due To The Crisis  154 
Change That Occurred Mean  
Employees 
Workload increased 0.377 
Work was reorganized 0.271 
Moved to another job 0.079 
Wages frozen or cut 0.472 
Non-wage benefits reduced 0.084 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.026 
Access to paid overtime restricted 0.226 
Required to take unpaid leave 0.021 
Access to training restricted 0.176 
Managers 
Compulsory redundancies 0.323 
Voluntary redundancies 0.453 
Temporary freeze on recruitment 0.659 
Postponement of plans for expansion 0.364 
Wages frozen or cut 0.656 
Reduction in non-wage benefits 0.150 
Reduction in basic hours 0.081 
Reduction in paid overtime 0.346 
Required to take unpaid leave 0.043 
Reduction in the use of agency staff 0.517 
Increase in the use of agency staff 0.092 
Reduction in training expenditure 0.425 
Other action 0.565 
Worker Representatives 
Redundancies 0.588 
Change agency staff 0.468 
Wages frozen or cut 0.707 
Introduction of performance pay 0.048 
Change working time arrangements 0.293 
Change organization of work 0.534 
Other action 0.064 
Note: All options for each group are presented here. The number of employees observed is 4,802 and the number of workplaces is 393.  155 
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Table II – Descriptive Statistics for employees 156 
 
Mean S.D. 
Common mental distress 23.291 5.201 
   Tense 3.311 1.011 
   Depressed 4.121 1.051 
   Worried 3.751 1.041 
   Gloomy 3.991 1.061 
   Uneasy 3.941 1.051 
   Miserable 4.181 1.051 
Region 
North East 0.061 0.231 
Yorkshire and Humber 0.091 0.291 
East Midlands 0.071 0.261 
East Anglia 0.031 0.181 
South East 0.241 0.431 
South West 0.091 0.291 
West Midlands 0.071 0.251 
North West 0.121 0.331 
Wales  0.081 0.271 
Scotland 0.141 0.351 
Age Groups 
16-17 0.001 0.031 
18-19 0.001 0.061 
20-21 0.011 0.081 
22-29 0.111 0.311 
30-39 0.211 0.411 
40-49 0.321 0.461 
50-59 0.291 0.451 
60-64 0.061 0.231 
>64 0.011 0.101 
Ethnicity 0.931 0.261 
Gender: Male 0.461 0.501 
Private Sector 0.351 0.481 
Online 0.141 0.351 
Worker Rep. Involvement 0.741 0.441 
Note: Our common mental distress variable has a minimum of 0 and a maxinum of 30, the underlying questions have five levels. All other 157 
variables are binary and are therefore limited between 0 and 1. The number of employees observed is 4,802 and the number of workplaces is 158 
393.  159 
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3. METHODS 160 
The baseline methodological approach is an OLS regression. 161 
                           (1) 
In all equations subscript   indicates individual employees and subscript   indicates workplaces. The 162 
coefficients of interest in equation (1) are the vector of crisis effects (      ) and its association with 163 
common mental distress (    When employing the responses from managers and worker 164 
representatives on how the crisis affected the workplace the vector of crisis effects loses the subscript i 165 
as this information is only available on workplace level. The model furthermore includes a vector of 166 
control variables ( ) outlined in the previous section. 167 
The usual concern in such a model is that the variable of interest is endogenous as common mental 168 
distress could affect for example the wage of the individual (Kronenberg et al., 2017). For example 169 
some workplaces could be more resilient to recessions given workplace level characteristics such as 170 
workplace culture. Workplace culture is inherently unobservable, but given that workplace level 171 
factors are identical for all employees, a workplace fixed effect model can be estimated to account for 172 
this. In essence we are saying that workplace culture was an unobserved variable in equation (1) that 173 
was absorbed by the error term    . The aim is therefore to rid     of workplace level invariant 174 
characteristics represented by    in equation (2). 175 
           (2) 
By subtracting the workplace averages from equation (2) is transformed to: 176 
                       (3) 
If    is the same for the entire workplace                 and therefore all workplace-177 
invariant factors, including unobservable factors like workplace culture, drop out leaving us with: 178 
                             (4) 
Reichert and Tauchmann (2017) have previously explored another concern, namely that employees in 179 
small firms are able to influence how their workplace reacts to economic shocks. They test this by 180 
splitting their sample by firm size as they have no measure of the degree of worker-involvement in 181 
managerial decision making. The exclusion of employees from small firms hardly affected their 182 
results. However, if employees can really influence how their firm reacted to the crisis, they might 183 
have included the expected effect of potential changes on their common mental distress and influenced 184 
the workplace in such a way as to minimize these. This would lead to reverse causality in which not 185 
only the reactions to the crisis affect common mental distress, but common mental distress also 186 
9 
determined how the workplace reacted to the crisis. WERS 2011 is a unique data source to explore the 187 
hypothesis that employees are able to or at least perceive themselves to be able to influence 188 
managerial questions. Instead of only proxying the (perceived) ability to influence managerial 189 
decisions by workplace or firm size we also test this hypothesis with questions that directly ask worker 190 
representatives about their involvement in changes at the workplace (see the last paragraph in section 191 
2). Based on this question we can test within small and large workplaces whether or not differential 192 
relationships are found. 193 
In all cases the error term is clustered at workplace level. It is necessary to adjust the error-194 
term, as it is likely that the errors are correlated within workplaces, which unadjusted for 195 
could lead to misleadingly small standard errors. We assume that the error-terms between 196 
workplaces are uncorrelated. We also apply this procedure in the fixed effect estimation, 197 
because the fixed effect approach will control only for a share of the within-workplace 198 
correlation of the error-term. However, it is possible that it will not control for the entire 199 
within-workplace error correlation (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Cameron and Miller (2015) also 200 
report that if cluster sizes are small (1-25 in our case) standard errors should be based on a 201 
within-estimator compared to a least squares dummy variable estimator. To use the correct 202 
degrees of freedom for the within estimator, the xtreg command in Stata with the vce(robust) 203 
option was used (Cameron and Miller (2015), p. 331). 204 
  205 
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4.  RESULTS 206 
Table III presents the baseline results using OLS with and without controls in the model. The results 207 
show that employee-perceived crisis effects are strongly associated with employee common mental 208 
distress while manager and worker representative reported crisis effects are substantially smaller and 209 
rarely statistically distinguishable from zero. For employees the difference between estimates with and 210 
without controls is very small, we will therefore focus on the presentation with controls. In employees 211 
who remained in employment during the crisis, nearly all crisis-induced changes worsen employees' 212 
common mental distress as indicated by negative coefficients. The three strongest relationships are 213 
found for increased workload, access to training restricted, and having moved to another (internal) job. 214 
What might be surprising is that the associations relating to financial reductions (wages frozen or cut, 215 
contracted workings hours reduced, access to paid overtime restricted, required to take unpaid leave) 216 
are comparatively small with some insignificant and positive signed. For the two non-significant 217 
coefficients it must be noted though, that they were very rare occurrences in our sample (reduced 218 
contracted working hours n =125; unpaid leave n = 101), which may have reduced the precision for 219 
estimating this specific effect. 220 
For the manager part of Table III only taking unpaid leave, reducing agency staff and reduction 221 
training expenditure are statistically significant in both the regression with and without controls, while 222 
compulsory redundancies is only statistically significant in the regression without controls. We remind 223 
the reader that in these models the crisis vector in equation (1) loses the   subscript – although the 224 
model still estimates the average association on all survey responses, the crisis-induced changes are 225 
only measured once per workplace and are the same for all individuals for one workplace. The 226 
coefficient of compulsory redundancies is positive implying that compulsory redundancies improve 227 
the common mental distress of the remaining employees, potentially because the remaining employees 228 
perceive their jobs to be safer after the departure of their colleagues. This is opposite to the findings in 229 
Reichert and Tauchmann (2017) but they analyse plant closures in Germany, which might be different 230 
from the crisis in Great Britain (GB) given the differential social security systems and labour market 231 
situations of the two countries. Reductions in training expenditure have a negative sign, i.e. the 232 
remaining employees' common mental distress is increased by this measure, which could be seen as an 233 
objective indicator of reductions in cash-flow in the company and therefore an indicator of insecurity. 234 
In the worker representative part of Table III only one crisis-induced change shows a significant 235 
association in both regressions with and without controls, the change in agency staff worsen common 236 
mental distress. The remaining coefficients are all negative with the exception of “change organization 237 
of work” and “other action”, which is also statistically significant in the without controls regression. 238 
  239 
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Table III – OLS baseline results for the change in common mental distress due to workplace changes 240 
caused by the 2008-11 financial crisis 241 
Change due to crisis Without controls With controls 
Employees 
Workload increased -1.874*** [0.170] -1.842*** [0.168] 
Work was reorganised -0.600*** [0.190] -0.622*** [0.187] 
Moved to another job -1.035*** [0.308] -0.938*** [0.307] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.416*** [0.156] -0.430*** [0.157] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.808*** [0.282] -0.846*** [0.289] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.355 [0.539] 0.251 [0.538] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.678*** [0.188] -0.677*** [0.186] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.473 [0.601] -0.399 [0.627] 
Access to training restricted -0.973*** [0.206] -0.987*** [0.205] 
Managers 
Compulsory redundancies 0.326* [0.192] 0.308 [0.211] 
Voluntary redundancies -0.207 [0.194] -0.149 [0.200] 
Temporary freeze on recruitment -0.228 [0.218] -0.268 [0.219] 
Postponement of plans for expansion 0.201 [0.206] 0.174 [0.200] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.069 [0.196] -0.045 [0.199] 
Reduction in non-wage benefits 0.122 [0.258] 0.074 [0.270] 
Reduction in basic hours 0.217 [0.290] 0.173 [0.308] 
Reduction in paid overtime -0.171 [0.200] -0.169 [0.194] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.78* [0.454] -0.777* [0.455] 
Reduction in the use of agency staff -0.395* [0.204] -0.366* [0.201] 
Increase in the use of agency staff -0.326 [0.322] -0.289 [0.316] 
Reduction in training expenditure -0.484** [0.193] -0.449** [0.196] 
Other action -0.207 [0.196] -0.135 [0.190] 
Worker Representatives 
Redundancies -0.080 [0.202] -0.058 [0.197] 
Change agency staff -0.368* [0.196] -0.332* [0.193] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.172 [0.205] -0.256 [0.202] 
Introduction of performance pay -0.281 [0.477] -0.227 [0.454] 
Change working time arrangements -0.328 [0.242] -0.265 [0.238] 
Change organisation of work 0.017 [0.200] 0.027 [0.198] 
Other action 0.539* [0.320] 0.292 [0.318] 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error reported in square brackets. The error term is clustered at workplace level. Each 242 
section (employees, mangers and worker representatives) represent two separate regression on employee level with and without controls. The 243 
dependent variable is a measure of common mental distress ranging from 0 to 30. Lower values of the dependent variable indicate worse 244 
common mental distress.The controls are region (8 regions for England, Scotland and Wales), age from 16 onwards grouped in 9 categories, 245 
whether the person is white or non-white, male or female, works in the private or public sector , and whether the employee submitted the 246 
survey online or via paper. The number of employees observed is 4,802 and the number of workplaces is 393.  247 
12 
It is possible that some workplaces have better or worse workplace cultures that affected the results or 248 
particularly gifted managers or worker representatives. All of these factors, while difficult to observe, 249 
are fixed within workplaces and therefore can be accounted for by introducing workplace fixed effects. 250 
Table IV presents the results for this fixed effect estimation. Given that workplace representative and 251 
manager replies do not vary within workplaces that part of the table drops out and only the top part 252 
relating to employee reported crisis effects remains. The share of the estimated variance of the overall 253 
error accounted for by the workplace effect (rho) is 0.135 and 0.134 respectively, which indicates that 254 
the workplace fixed effect is not extremely important and thus unobservable workplace-invariant 255 
factors such as workplace culture or particularly gifted managers or worker representatives are not 256 
likely to bias the estimation substantially. It appears that in most instances the same aspects of work 257 
matter for mental distress whether or not we account for unobservable factors workplace-invariant 258 
factors. On page 188 of their work Reichert and Tauchmann (2017) for example state that one of their 259 
key assumptions is “that firm-level changes in the workforce are exogenous events from the 260 
perspective of an individual employee”. Even though, we observe workplaces and not firms, our 261 
results appear to support that assumption. 262 
The three largest associations from the OLS regression (Table III) remain important and relatively 263 
unchanged in size, even when only considering within-workplace variation (increased workload, 264 
access to training restricted, and reductions of non-wage benefits). However, they are joined by having 265 
to take unpaid leave, which is now the second-strongest effect, nearly quadrupling in size compared to 266 
the OLS result, but is only significant when considering control variables and as noted previously, due 267 
to the small number of instances, very imprecisely measured. Another important change occurs for 268 
wages frozen or cut, which roughly doubles in size. 269 
Across OLS and fixed effects regressions nearly all of the effects of the crisis covered in the survey 270 
show a potential negative impact on work-related common mental distress. Only the reduction in 271 
contracted working hours was not significant in any of the analyses, which may be due to rarity in our 272 
sample. When controlling for unobserved workplace-invariant factors via fixed effects regression, 273 
changes are especially observed for requiring to take unpaid leave and freezing/cutting of wages, 274 
which become much more important than in the OLS regression. It appears that financial factors are 275 
more relevant within workplace than between workplaces. This is potentially due to differential wage 276 
distribution between workplaces. 277 
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Table IV – Effect workplace changes caused by the 2008-11 financial crisis on common mental 279 
distress after introducing workplace fixed effect 280 
Change due to crisis Without controls With controls 
Workload increased -1.808*** [0.171] -1.787*** [0.173] 
Work was reorganised -0.543*** [0.200] -0.551*** [0.198] 
Moved to another job -1.101*** [0.306] -1.049*** [0.304] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.894*** [0.164] -0.836*** [0.166] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.843*** [0.308] -0.804** [0.312] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.117 [0.566] 0.096 [0.580] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.649*** [0.196] -0.634*** [0.196] 
Required to take unpaid leave -1.440 [0.874] -1.510* [0.868] 
Access to training restricted -0.923*** [0.214] -0.899*** [0.214] 
rho 0.135 0.134 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error reported in square brackets. The error term is clustered at workplace level. Manager 281 
and worker representative results are not presented as no workplace fixed effect can be estimated given that the manager and worker 282 
representative replies are fixed per workplace. The columns present the estimates with and without controls. The dependent variable is a 283 
measure of common mental distress ranging from 0 to 30. Lower values of the dependent variable indicate worse common mental distress. 284 
The controls are region (8 regions for England, Scotland and Wales), age from 16 onwards grouped in 9 categories, whether the person is 285 
white or non-white, male or female, works in the private or public sector, and whether the employee submitted the survey online or via paper. 286 
The number of employees observed is 4,802 and the number of workplaces is 393. 287 
Finally, we employed two tests to investigate the potential for reverse causation of employees 288 
influencing implemented changes at their workplaces. Table V presents fixed effect regression results 289 
with workplaces split into low- and high-involvement workplaces based on the statement of the 290 
worker representative (see columns of Table V). We first re-ran the fixed effects regression with all 291 
employees in those two categories and again we find negative signs for nearly all crisis-induced 292 
changes. In companies that are classified as "high involvement", reducing non-wage benefits and 293 
being required to take unpaid leave correlate negatively with common mental distress. Whether or not 294 
a workplace is classified as low- or high-involvement by the representative does not generally 295 
moderate the relationship between perceived crisis-induced changes at the workplace and workplace 296 
related common mental distress, but it may do so for specific types of changes. 297 
Reichert and Tauchmann (2017) have suggested that employees in small firms are able to influence 298 
how their workplace reacts to economic shocks. The results in Table V provide some support for that 299 
idea, in high involvement small companies reorganised work has a small and statistically insignificant 300 
coefficient. In high involvement large companies reorganised work has a statistically significant 301 
negative signed coefficient. The coefficient for the case of low involvement large companies is even 302 
larger and also statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the case of low involvement small 303 
companies is qualitatively of similar size, but less precisely estimated. 304 
The cut-off is the median firm size in WERS 2011, which is 244 employees. Within all four groups of 305 
the combination of these two indictors of involvement the signs of all but three crisis-induced changes 306 
remain negative. The coefficients with positive signs are (1) required to take unpaid leave in low 307 
involvement large companies; (2) access restrictions to training in low involvement large companies; 308 
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and 3) contracted working hours having been reduced in high involvement large companies for all 309 
employees and for employees in small low involvement companies. 310 
A number of coefficients are not significant anymore, which can be due to loss of precision with 311 
smaller sample sizes (especially in the low involvement group of companies). Nevertheless, if it were 312 
possible for employees in high-involvement small companies to influence their company's decisions 313 
more, then we would expect their regression coefficients to indicate weaker connections than in the 314 
other three cases. However, overall there is no pattern suggesting this, if at all only for two workplace 315 
changes does the coefficient pattern point in that direction (reorganisation of work and reduction of 316 
hours). Due to the non-randomized nature of our data, limited control variables and high number of 317 
comparisons this can only be a descriptive assessment, but to us it suggests that if workers influence 318 
was used in our sample to re-structure work places to their liking and demands, then this did not 319 
happen uniformly. 320 
Overall, we find that in a survey of employee's who remained employed during the crisis in 321 
workplaces that were likely hit by the crisis that several of the crisis-induced changes correlated with 322 
worse/more common mental distress as predicted. Across OLS and fixed effects regression increased 323 
workload, followed by access restrictions to training and moving to another (internal) job, emerged as 324 
the strongest predictors. The OLS regressions further suggested that crisis-induced changes 325 
remembered by management and worker representatives were not strongly correlated with employees' 326 
common mental distress, which points to the perception of such changes by employees being an 327 
important factor. 328 
Finally, there appears to be very little evidence that workplace culture, quality of management or 329 
quality of representation affect the results or that the results are driven by employees influencing how 330 
the workplace reacted to the crises.  331 
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Table V – Fixed effect regression results with controls exploring employee influence on manager 332 
decisions 333 
Change due to 2008 financial crisis Low Involvement High Involvement 
All Employees 
Workload increased -1.518*** [0.336] -1.885*** [0.203] 
Work was reorganised -1.023** [0.420] -0.406* [0.225] 
Moved to another job -1.440** [0.696] -0.905*** [0.332] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.621** [0.296] -0.869*** [0.198] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -1.160 [0.701] -0.717** [0.347] 
Contracted working hours reduced -0.556 [1.497] 0.249 [0.635] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.773* [0.407] -0.597*** [0.227] 
Required to take unpaid leave -1.267 [2.181] -1.478* [0.866] 
Access to training restricted -0.585 [0.409] -1.020*** [0.251] 
rho 0.137 0.131 
N (employees) 1,231 3,571 
N (workplaces) 101 292 
Employees in small companies 
Workload increased -1.163** [0.452] -1.866*** [0.322] 
Work was reorganised -1.012 [0.639] -0.147 [0.332] 
Moved to another job -2.411** [1.061] -1.627*** [0.473] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.501 [0.404] -0.818*** [0.305] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.772 [0.842] -0.865 [0.536] 
Contracted working hours reduced 2.946* [1.677] -0.435 [0.922] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.558 [0.530] -0.358 [0.344] 
Required to take unpaid leave -1.566 [2.523] -1.957 [1.338] 
Access to training restricted -1.193** [0.548] -1.202*** [0.392] 
rho 0.116 0.136 
N (employees) 687 1,718 
N (workplaces) 52 139 
Employees in large companies 
Workload increased -1.933*** [0.508] -1.944*** [0.261] 
Work was reorganised -1.126* [0.564] -0.693** [0.304] 
Moved to another job -0.521 [0.904] -0.317 [0.440] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.775* [0.433] -0.856*** [0.252] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -2.010** [0.977] -0.564 [0.453] 
Contracted working hours reduced -4.017*** [1.212] 1.629*** [0.410] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -1.106* [0.631] -0.830*** [0.304] 
Required to take unpaid leave 0.245 [3.273] -0.495 [0.832] 
Access to training restricted 0.067 [0.624] -0.827** [0.324] 
rho 0.175 0.128 
N (employees) 544 1,853 
N (workplaces) 49 153 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error reported in square brackets. The error term is clustered at workplace level. The controls 334 
are age from 16 onwards grouped in 9 categories, whether the person is white or non-white, male or female, works in the private or public 335 
sector , and whether the employee submitted the survey online or via paper.  336 
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4.1. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 337 
We conduct some checks whether our results are driven by gender as both mental health behaviour and 338 
labour market patterns vary a lot with gender (Breuer, 2015; Cawley et al., 2015). Thus, we re-run the 339 
analysis reported in the right column of Table III by gender (an additional robustness analysis 340 
accounting for heterogeneity in the dependent variable is presented in the online appendix). Table VI 341 
presents the results split by gender, comparing these results to the right column of Table III point to 342 
some interesting associations. Since the previous analysis showed little difference between FE and 343 
OLS results (see discussion of Table III & Table IV), we again report OLS results here to report results 344 
on all three perspectives on crisis-induced changes 345 
Increased workload remains the crisis-induced work change with the largest coefficient for both men 346 
and women. However, some of the statistically significant results in Table III are driven by one gender 347 
and not the other. Males drive the associations relating to (financial) work-benefits (frozen or cut 348 
wages, reduced non-wage benefits and restricted access to paid overtime). Women on the other side 349 
drive associations that could be summarized as “fear of unemployment” (reorganisation of work, 350 
moved to another job and access restrictions to training). 351 
These were all employee self-reported crisis changes, considering the changes reported by managers 352 
and worker representatives all the previously statistically significant results are driven by females, 353 
except a manager-reported reduction in training expenses. Again the associations appear to be related 354 
to a concern about being employed (temporary freeze on recruitment, postponement of expansion 355 
plans, required to take unpaid leave, reduction in use of agency staff, increase in the use of agency 356 
staff, change in agency staff). The differences are potentially related to different work and employment 357 
patterns along gender lines/across gender groups (Goldin, 2014; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). A 358 
potential underlying reason for this are classical gender roles with males being in charge of providing 359 
economic means of survival. 360 
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Table VI – OLS results for the change in common mental distress due to workplace changes caused by 362 
the 2008-11 financial crisis by gender 363 
Change due to crisis Male Female 
Employees 
Workload increased -1.697*** [0.249] -1.989*** [0.220] 
Work was reorganised -0.294 [0.273] -0.873*** [0.245] 
Moved to another job -0.687 [0.484] -1.182*** [0.387] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.536** [0.246] -0.309 [0.202] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -1.107*** [0.366] -0.571 [0.444] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.439 [0.838] 0.093 [0.600] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -1.002*** [0.285] -0.351 [0.258] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.856 [0.933] 0.251 [0.766] 
Access to training restricted -0.198 [0.306] -1.617*** [0.279] 
Managers 
Compulsory redundancies 0.289 [0.292] 0.384 [0.268] 
Voluntary redundancies 0.005 [0.281] -0.279 [0.253] 
Temporary freeze on recruitment 0.036 [0.308] -0.492* [0.265] 
Postponement of plans for expansion -0.178 [0.278] 0.478* [0.249] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.126 [0.266] 0.037 [0.272] 
Reduction in non-wage benefits 0.046 [0.354] 0.158 [0.349] 
Reduction in basic hours 0.352 [0.455] -0.234 [0.394] 
Reduction in paid overtime -0.308 [0.260] -0.026 [0.249] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.214 [0.567] -1.217* [0.672] 
Reduction in the use of agency staff 0.039 [0.274] -0.712*** [0.257] 
Increase in the use of agency staff 0.530 [0.376] -0.949** [0.445] 
Reduction in training expenditure -0.561* [0.287] -0.470* [0.239] 
Other action 0.189 [0.273] -0.444* [0.236] 
Worker Representatives 
Redundancies -0.070 [0.240] 0.002 [0.258] 
Change agency staff -0.043 [0.239] -0.591** [0.259] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.332 [0.261] -0.170 [0.273] 
Introduction of performance pay -0.295 [0.654] -0.191 [0.521] 
Change working time arrangements -0.057 [0.282] -0.443 [0.304] 
Change organisation of work 0.112 [0.255] -0.004 [0.267] 
Other action -0.035 [0.475] 0.561 [0.433] 
N (employees) 2,192 2,610 
N (workplaces) 366 370 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error reported in square brackets. The error term is clustered at workplace level. Each 364 
section (employees, mangers and worker representatives) represent two separate regression on employee level one for men and one for 365 
females. The dependent variable is a measure of common mental distress ranging from 0 to 30. Lower values of the dependent variable 366 
indicate worse common mental distress.The controls are region (8 regions for England, Scotland and Wales), age from 16 onwards grouped 367 
in 9 categories, whether the person is white or non-white, works in the private or public sector , and whether the employee submitted the 368 
survey online or via paper.  369 
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5. DISCUSSION 370 
In this paper we study how the crisis affected work-related common mental distress of employees who 371 
were in continuous employment during the crisis. Many previous studies only explore the financial 372 
dimensions as a causal connector between the crisis and common mental distress (McInerney et al., 373 
2013; Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015). Our study adds to this by exploring a large host of factors that could be 374 
triggered by the crisis and worsen common mental distress. 375 
Indeed, no prior work has considered such a large number of changes within workplaces and their 376 
effects on common mental distress. We fill this gap by using detailed questions on how the crisis 377 
affected the workplace and how employees' work-related common mental distress was affected by 378 
this. Additionally, while most previous work relied on surveyed individuals reporting whether or not 379 
they were affected by the crisis (Deaton, 2012; Jones et al., 2016; McInerney et al., 2013; Ólafsdóttir 380 
et al., 2015), we leverage data from three perspectives on the impact of the 2008-11 financial crisis 381 
(employees, worker representatives, managers) to reduce the potential impact of justification bias.  382 
We find that the 2008-11 financial crisis affected employee work-related common mental distress 383 
more strongly via an increase in workload, a factor that has been absent from the economics debate so 384 
far. On the other hand financial factors such as reduced wages only appear to be one of many factors 385 
connecting the crisis to reductions in common mental distress. 386 
The results presented here are limited to the 2008-11 financial crisis. Though, Ruhm (2016) has shown 387 
that the health effect of crisis is similar to that of less severe economic downturns. It is therefore 388 
possible that the findings presented here are generalizable beyond the 2008-11 financial crisis. 389 
A limitation of this study is that we only consider crisis-“survivors” who are continuously employed. It 390 
is likely that the common mental distress of those becoming unemployed due to the crisis was 391 
adversely affected (Breuer, 2015; Parmar et al., 2016). Nevertheless, previous research suggests that it 392 
is not only unemployment that affects mental health (Clark et al., 2010). Many of the effects of the 393 
crisis covered in the survey of employees can be seen as indicators of increased job insecurity and 394 
potential precariousness. Previous research has shown that both precariousness and unemployment are 395 
independent contributors to effects on mental health (Julià et al., 2017; Kim and von dem Knesebeck, 396 
2015). Precariousness is argued to be predictive of mental illness in the workforce (Han et al., 2017) 397 
and specifically contractual changes that increase the perceived precariousness of jobs have a negative 398 
impact on mental health (Moscone et al., 2016) and workplace related perceptions (Van Aerden et al., 399 
2016). 400 
We do not make any causal claim, because employees studied here are not randomly affected by the 401 
crisis. The potential of bias due to more resilient employees being continuously employed remains as 402 
well as the possibility that employees select into certain jobs conditional on their common mental 403 
distress. The ideal solution would be to have a measure of workplace culture that could be added to the 404 
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model or instrumental variables that determine how the workplace reacted to the crisis but does not 405 
affect the employee common mental distress, other than indirectly through the workplace reaction to 406 
the crisis. An alternative approach to tackle that some employees are more resilient than others would 407 
be to account for baseline levels of mental distress, but unfortunately WERS does not provide 408 
observations for the same individuals over time. A similar concern are buffer-mechanisms. Wealth for 409 
example is not observable for us and might buffer the effect between crisis-induced workplace changes 410 
and common mental distress with the wealthier employees being less affected by the crisis-induced 411 
workplace change than the less wealthy employees. However, in the absence of causal estimates in the 412 
literature and the unavailability of better data, our fixed effects approach offers insights into the 413 
relationships between specific crisis-induced changes in the workplace and common mental distress in 414 
the workplace currently not available in the literature. 415 
Finally, the definition of mental health and illness in a general population is not straightforward 416 
(Böhnke and Croudace, 2016; Stewart-Brown et al., 2015). In our case the survey assessed as specific 417 
component, the amount of job-related mental distress an employee experiences. While the questions 418 
cover fairly typical adjectives used in other instruments as well (Stochl et al., 2016), they cover only 419 
negative descriptors, which means that an assessment of positive mental health was not possible 420 
(Böhnke and Croudace, 2016). 421 
To conclude, managers and worker representatives might have perceived the economic literature so far 422 
in way that implied cutting non-financial benefits such as increasing workload as the least-worst 423 
option in reacting to a recession. This study raises some doubt whether this is the best course of action. 424 
Indeed managers should seek to balance reductions in necessary monetary and non-monetary 425 
reductions with respect to the mental distress of their staff. The future work on the effect of the 426 
financial crisis on mental health should invest more effort into exploring the causal chain between the 427 
financial crisis and their respective outcome to test the replicability of these results in other context. A 428 
better understanding of the mechanisms could then be translated into concrete policy 429 
recommendations. 430 
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APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS OF THE 1 
COMMON MENTAL DISTRESS INDEX 2 
The following offers a question-by-question sensitivity analysis of the responses to the individual 3 
questions of the mental distress index (Jones et al., 2016; Warr, 1990). These results are presented as 4 
an online appendix for two reasons, the level of the theoretical argument and the scaling of the 5 
dependent variables. 6 
First, the index offers a more generalizable summary of the continued experience of common mental 7 
distress in the workplace since it does depend less on individuals' propensities to experience specific 8 
symptoms or their specific interpretations of an individual adjective. This interpretation is in line with 9 
the common use of such indices in epidemiology and individual differences research and especially 10 
such adjective lists have been shown to be largely exchangeable indicators for common mental 11 
distress (e.g., Böhnke and Croudace (2016); Jones et al. (2016); Stochl et al. (2016); Warr (1990)). 12 
The argument presented in the main paper connecting crisis-induced changes at the workplace and 13 
work-related common mental distress is on the level of this more abstract variable. But relationships 14 
between individual indicators and specific workplace related changes might be interesting for future 15 
research in the area. 16 
Second, applying a fixed effects framework to the individual, ordinal question responses may lead to 17 
biases in the estimation of the relationships (Liddell & Kruschke, 2018). Averaging question 18 
responses, subtracting workplace averages from individual responses, and applying an OLS 19 
framework all assume that the dependent variable is interval-scaled. This is clearly not the case, but 20 
for comparability with the results of the main paper, this approach was retained. 21 
Table A1 splits the mental distress variable into its six parts (tense, depressed, worried, gloomy, 22 
uneasy and misery). Overall, we examine nine crisis-induced workplace changes and their respective 23 
associations are quite homogenous in magnitude and precision across the six indicators of mental 24 
distress. For three of the crisis-induced workplace changes the coefficient is significant no matter 25 
what the outcome is: Increases in workload, reduction of non-work benefits, and restrictions to access 26 
training are all connected to statistically significant increases in common mental distress. Being 27 
required to take unpaid leave is not significant with large standard errors independent of the outcome 28 
variable. 29 
For three further crisis-induced changes significant relationships are found for five out of six outcome 30 
variables. Reorganising work and moving to another job were not connected with feeling "tense" and 31 
cutting or freezing wages was not connected to "misery". The two crisis-induced changes that remain 32 
are a reduction in contracted working hours and a restriction in paid overtime. A reduction in 33 
contracted working hours is highly significant with a large and positive coefficient in the case of tense 34 
being the outcome, but in all other cases being insignificant with smaller coefficients. Access 35 
24 
restrictions to paid overtime showed consistently negative coefficients, but insignificant when tense 1 
and worried are the outcomes. 2 
Table A1 – Workplace fixed-effect regression results for the change in each question underlying the 3 
common mental distress measure due to workplace changes caused by the 2008-11 financial crisis 4 
 Tense Depressed 
Workload increased -0.425*** [0.033] -0.283*** [0.037] 
Work was reorganised -0.039 [0.039] -0.082** [0.040] 
Moved to another job -0.102* [0.054] -0.195*** [0.067] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.132*** [0.035] -0.142*** [0.035] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.144** [0.059] -0.113* [0.061] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.117 [0.098] 0.012 [0.127] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.072* [0.038] -0.138*** [0.042] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.261* [0.152] -0.237 [0.171] 
Access to training restricted -0.180*** [0.039] -0.108** [0.046] 
 Worried Gloomy 
Workload increased -0.328*** [0.036] -0.236*** [0.037] 
Work was reorganised -0.091** [0.041] -0.138*** [0.041] 
Moved to another job -0.168*** [0.060] -0.162** [0.065] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.159*** [0.034] -0.125*** [0.033] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.139** [0.058] -0.147** [0.064] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.006 [0.100] 0.033 [0.121] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.069* [0.039] -0.135*** [0.041] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.171 [0.184] -0.117 [0.168] 
Access to training restricted -0.142*** [0.042] -0.176*** [0.046] 
 Uneasy Misery 
Workload increased -0.292*** [0.038] -0.224*** [0.037] 
Work was reorganised -0.120*** [0.041] -0.082** [0.040] 
Moved to another job -0.209*** [0.059] -0.213*** [0.067] 
Wages frozen or cut -0.166*** [0.034] -0.112*** [0.034] 
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.146** [0.064] -0.116* [0.068] 
Contracted working hours reduced 0.594 [0.111] -0.013 [0.134] 
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.075* [0.040] -0.145*** [0.042] 
Required to take unpaid leave -0.514*** [0.196] -0.211 [0.160] 
Access to training restricted -0.166*** [0.044] -0.126*** [0.045] 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error reported in square brackets. The error term is clustered at workplace level. The 5 
controls are region (8 regions for England, Scotland and Wales), age from 16 onwards grouped in 9 categories, whether the person is white 6 
or non-white, male or female, works in the private or public sector , and whether the employee submitted the survey online or via paper. The 7 
number of employees observed is 4,802 and the number of workplaces is 393. 8 
 9 
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